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JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2002) grants jurisdiction to the Utah 
Supreme Court to review an opinion of the Court of Appeals by Writ of Certiorari. 
The Court granted Susan and Garth Hardinger (hereinafter "Hardinger") petition 
parenting verses the court's desire to support grandparent's desire to visit with 
grandchildren 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The Proceedings 
originated in the Fourth District Court when the child's biological mother, Jenifer 
Blundell, filed a Petition for divorce. At that time, her child, Baylie, was residing 
with her so Jenifer had physical custody of Baylie. The child's biological father, 
Alfie Dominique (Nick) Blundell, filed an answer to the divorce complaint from 
jail. He was not allowed visitation while he was incarcerated. Nick's mother, 
Lorraine Warren, intervened and requested paternal grandparent visitation while 
Nick was incarcerated. The District Court granted Lorraine Warren temporary 
visitation. Upon release from jail, Nick sought visitation with his child, Baylie. 
Nick was granted supervised visitation. His sister Kimberly Scott and her husband 
Kenneth Scott (Appellants in this matter and hereinafter referred to as "Scotts") 
were appointed to supervise Nick's visitation with Baylie. 
The biological mother, Jenifer Blundell, was having trouble with her family 
and with the law. Jenifer determined it would be in Baylie's best interest for the 
Scott's to have custody of Baylie. In accordance with her decision, Jenifer signed 
custody of Baylie to the Scotts. Based on this voluntary assignment of custody and 
other factors the Scotts filed a Petition for Custody and Guardianship in the 
Juvenile Court. The issues related to Baylie were removed from the Fourth 
District Court to the Fourth District Juvenile Court based on the Petition alleging 
neglect. 
Jenifer's parents, Susan and Garth Hardinger, filed a Petition in the Juvenile 
Court seeking custody and Guardianship be awarded to them. They did not and 
never have filed a petition for maternal grandparent visitation or adoption. While 
competing custody and guardianship petitions were pending, the Guardian Ad 
Litem for Baylie, Kelly Frye, filed a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of 
Nick and Jenifer Blundell. The Juvenile Court granted the Petition after an 
evidentiary hearing and terminated Nick and Jenifer's parental rights. 
After two custodial evaluations recommending the Scotts be awarded 
custody and multiple mediation sessions, the Scott's and the Hardinger's signed a 
Stipulation whereby the Hardinger's Petition for Custody and Guardianship was 
withdrawn and the Scott's were awarded Custody and Guardianship over Baylie 
Blundell. The Hardingers were awarded visitation similar to the visitation 
normally awarded to a non-custodial parent in a divorce case as set forth by the 
Utah Legislature as the Utah Minimum Visitation Schedule. 
The Scott's filed a Petition for Adoption. A Decree of Adoption was entered 
by the Juvenile Court. Upon the entry of the Decree of Adoption, Bay lie Scott 
came into existence. 
After the entry of the Decree of Adoption, the Hardinger's continued to 
spend time with Baylie. The Scotts and the Hardingers worked with a Special 
Master appointed by the Juvenile Court to facilitate timesharing. While the parties 
were addressing these issues, Baylie disclosed to the family therapist potential 
sexual abuse by Garth Hardinger. The Scotts suspended visitation pending the 
investigation by Child Protective Services. 
At the direction of Child Protective Services investigator and the family 
therapist, the Scott's refused visitation with the Hardingers. While the Child 
Protective Services worked on an investigation the Hardingers demanded visitation 
and requested that the Juvenile Courts enter an Order requiring the Scotts to appear 
and show cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating the 
Guardianship and Visitation Order entered prior to the Decree of Adoption. The 
Scott's responded to the Order to Appear and Show Cause by filing a Motion to 
Quash the Order based on the juvenile court lacking jurisdiction. 
The Juvenile Court denied the Scotts Motion to Quash the Order to Appear. 
The Juvenile Court entered an Order of visitation as well as an Order granting 
judgment against the Scotts for the Hardinger's attorney fees incurred to bring the 
matter before the Juvenile Court. Judge Wilson issued the Orders after refusing to 
hear testimony from the Scotts. The Scotts appealed the assertion of jurisdiction 
and subsequent orders to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the 
Juvenile Court's assertion of jurisdiction and the award of attorney's fees to the 
Hardingers. The Hardingers sought and obtained certiorari to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. This case began with the Petition for Divorce filed on June 5,1998 by 
Jenifer Blundell against Alfie Dominique (Nick) Blundell. (4th District Court 
Docket print out. Addendum 1). 
2. Baylie Blundell is the biological child of Alfie Dominique (Nick) 
Blundell and Jenifer Blundell (4th District Court file, Petition and eventual 
Findings by Juvenile Court in support of the Order terminating Parental Rights and 
the findings in support of the Custody and Guardianship Order. (Juvenile Court 
Record (JCR) 278-286 & 338-343.) 
3. Jenifer Blundell was granted temporary custody of Baylie Blundell by 
the 4th District Court. (District Court Docket, Petition for Custody file by the Scotts 
JCR 1-9.) 
4. Lorraine Warren, as paternal grandmother, filed a Petition for 
Grandparent visitation. Temporary visitation was granted to Lorraine Warren 
(District Court Docket). 
5. Nick Blundell was granted visitation with Baylie Blundell to be 
supervised by the Scotts. (District Court Docket). 
6. February 23,1999: Ken and Kim Scott filed a Petition for Custody 
and Guardianship in the Fourth District Juvenile Court seeking Custody and 
Guardianship of Baylie Blundell (JCR 1-23). 
7. Jenifer Blundell signed an agreement to transfer physical custody of 
Baylie Blundell to the Scotts. (Attachments to Petition for Custody JCR 1-23). 
8. The District Court certified the issues of custody and visitation to the 
Fourth District Juvenile Court. (District Court Docket showing Order of Transfer 
and Amended Order of Transfer of September 28,1999: JCR 229-235). 
9. On May 5,1999, a Pre-Trial hearing was held in the juvenile Court at 
which time temporary legal and physical custody was awarded to the Scotts. (JCR 
84-88). 
10. On May 12,1999, Maternal grandparents, Susan and Garth Hardinger, 
filed an Answer to the Scott's Petition as well as a Counter Petition seeking 
custody and guardianship. (JCR 49-57). 
11. On June 15,1999, the Guardian Ad Litem filed a Petition on behalf of 
the child to terminate the biological parent's parental rights. (JCR 134-139). 
12. On June 16,1999, the court entered an Order continuing temporary 
custody to the Scotts and setting forth visitation for the grandparents, the 
Hardingers. (JCR 148-151). 
13. Dr. Daren Featherstone was appointed as an evaluator to complete a 
custodial evaluation. (JCR 148-151). 
14. Dr. Featherstone submitted his evaluation to the Court and the 
Hardingers requested a second evaluation be prepared. An Order was signed for a 
second evaluation to be completed by Dr. Robert Williams. (JCR 221-224). 
15. On November 23,1999 an evidentiary hearing was held on the 
Guardian Ad Litem's Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. The Court granted the 
Petition to Terminate Parental Rights and an Order with supporting findings 
terminating the biological parent's parental rights entered on January 28, 2000. 
(JCR 278-286). 
16. On March 28, 2000 a hearing was held wherein the Scotts and the 
Hardingers entered a Post-Mediation Stipulation on the record. The Stipulation 
stated that the Hardingers would withdraw their Petition for Custody and. 
Guardianship, receive visitation privileges, and that they would support the Scott's 
adoption of Baylie. (Clerk's Minute Sheet, JCR 291). 
17. On May 19, 2000, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order of Custody and Decree of Guardianship were entered. The court appointed 
Elizabeth Dalton to act as a Special Master to help the parties implement the 
Court's Orders. (JCR 314-317). 
18. On May 19, 2000, the Guardian Ad Litem was released. (JCR 344-
346). 
19. On June 5, 2000, the Juvenile Court granted the Scott's Petition for 
Adoption and entered a Decree of Adoption. (Facts set forth in the Juvenile 
Court's October 24, 2000 findings JCR 520-525). 
20. The Decree of Adoption is filed as case number: 968282-001; 
however, the Juvenile Court has assigned the adoption action case number of: 
986074. (Decree set forth in Addendum 3). 
21. File 986074 is a sealed Adoption File. No Motion has been made to 
un-seal the file and the file has not been reopened. (Court's Findings of Fact 
Denying Motion to Quash, JCR 520-525). 
22. The Decree of Adoption does not provide for visitation. (Decree set 
forth in Addendum 3 Findings of Judge Wilson dated October 24, 2000 JCR 507-
511). 
23. On June 27,2000, a Notice of the Termination of Parental Rights and 
the Entry of Custody and Guardianship Order were filed in the Juvenile Court and 
the District Court cases. (JCR 347-348, District Court Docket). 
24. The Hardingers filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause in Case 
968282-001 on August 11, 2000. The Hardingers claimed that visitation was 
terminated during July 2000. TheOrderwasissued August 21, 2000. (JCR 360-
364). 
25. On August 25,2000, the Scotts filed a Memorandum and Motion to 
Quash the Order requiring them to appear in case 968282-001. (JCR 366-389). 
26. On August 31, 2000, a Motion to re-instate the Guardian Ad Litem 
was filed. (JCR 391-392). 
27. On September 6, 2000, a hearing was held on the Motion to Quash 
and on the Order to Show Cause. The Court entered an Oral ruling denying the 
Motion to Quash and entered an Order of visitation. (JCR 467-468 Clerk's Minute 
Sheet. - The Appellant requested a Transcript from this hearing. However, the 
Juvenile Court's recording equipment was not working on the 6th and the reporter 
is unable to prepare an intelligible transcript. The Juvenile Court clerk filed a 
Minute Entry of the proceedings and the minute entry will be cited to.) 
28. The Scotts, through their attorney of record, requested and were 
denied the opportunity to give testimony in response to the Order to Show Cause. 
(JCR 467-468 Clerk's Minute Sheet and Court's written Findings and Order.) 
29. The Scott's Oral Motion to Certify the Case to the District Court was 
denied. (Court's Findings of Fact Denying Motion to Quash, JCR 520-525, Clerk's 
Minute Sheet on 9/6/00 hrg. 467-468). 
30. The Scott's Motion to Stay Visitation pending Appeal was denied. 
(Court's Findings of Fact Denying Motion to Quash, JCR 520-525, Clerk's Minute 
Sheet on 9/6/00 hrg. 467-468). 
31. On October 24, 2000, over the Scott's objection the Juvenile Court 
entered an award of $2,795.17 in attorney's fees to the Hardingers. (JCR 517-519 
and 487-499 & 514-516). 
32. On November 1,2000, the Scotts filed a Notice of Appeal. (JCR 528-
530). 
33. On November 1,2000, under protest and pending resolution of the 
Appeal, the Scotts filed a Petition to Modify the Visitation Portion of the Custody 
and Guardianship Order. (JCR 535-538). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly viewed this case as a determination of 
subject matter jurisdiction. This case hinges on the interrelation of different 
aspects of statutorily created law and a court of limited jurisdiction. The case 
began as a case in the District Court dealing with the dissolution of a marital 
contract. The case progressed to the Juvenile Court because of the parents 
neglecting the child. Finally, the case was completed as an adoption wherein a 
legal birth occurred and, in the eyes of the law, a new child was created. The 
petitioners ask this court to allow them to turn a blind eye to the adoption and 
enforce the visitation provided for in the guardianship order. 
The Hardingers never filed a Petition for Grandparent Visitation. This is not 
a grandparent visitation case and it can't become one because the Hardingers are 
not legal grandparents of Baylie. This case is not a contract case about a chattel. 
This case is about a child and the child's best interest. The parents have a 
constitutionally protected interest in making decisions for this child without the 
state interjecting itself into the home. In Utah, adoptions are creatures of statute. 
The legislation is clear, unambiguous and distinct from contract law. 
The Juvenile Court is a court of equity created by statute and has limited 
jurisdiction. Until there is a post adoption reason to create jurisdiction, there is no 
new basis for the Juvenile Court to act. The Scotts agree that the Juvenile Court 
retains jurisdiction to enforce valid orders. That is not the issue before this court. 
The issue is whether the juvenile court can enforce an order that is vacated by the 
Decree of Adoption. 
The Notice of Appeal adequately identified the issues to be reviewed. 
Because the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction or personal 
jurisdiction to require the Scotts to appear at the Order to Show Cause Hearing, the 
Juvenile Court was incorrect in awarding attorney fees against the Scotts. The 
Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the award of attorney's fees. The notice 
of appeal is to be construed liberally and was sufficient to notify the litigants of the 
issues to be reviewed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UNDERLYING ORDER WAS FINAL AND APPEALABLE 
The Hardinger's basic premise is correct, "An Appeal as of right may be 
taken only from a final Order. A final Order is one which 'ends the litigation on 
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." If the 
juvenile court not erroneously asserted jurisdiction the case would be over. The 
granting of the Motion to Quash certainly would be a final order. If court enforced 
visitation would have ended, voluntary visitation would have commenced and 
judicial insertion into this family would be withdrawn. 
It is difficult to determine when juvenile court orders are final. In many 
cases the juvenile court is required by statute to make a series of orders. The order 
in this case is similar to an adjudication order wherein the juvenile court makes a 
finding of jurisdiction, grants relief, and then schedules review hearings. See, In re 
M.W., 2000 UT 79,<][26,12 P.3d 80. In fact, the Court of Appeals relied on this 
language to determine that in the juvenile court, the denial of the motion to quash 
is a final order. 
It would be an error to adopt the argument of the petitioners and to treat this 
as an on going dispute and that the Order is not final. The child in this matter will 
be seven years old on July 29, 2003. If this court adopts the argument of 
petitioners it will be at least eleven more years before any final Order issues. The 
Hardingers realize that their ability to force visitation with Baylie is at stake. If a 
final order has not issued, the Hardingers will have a great incentive to prevent 
final orders from ever issuing. Given the nature of the proceedings in this case, the 
Order denying the Motion to Quash is a final Order. The issues not decided at the 
time of the hearing are distinct from the jurisdictional issue addressed by the 
motion to quash. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction and then entered on 
going orders based on the assertion. In a district court case, the issue of 
jurisdiction might be more amenable to later resolution. The Juvenile Court is a 
court of limited jurisdiction. The issue of whether the parties should be in juvenile 
court in the first place must be decided before the parties spend a child's childhood 
litigating visitation. 
The Decree of Adoption was entered on June 6,2000. (TR 520-525). The 
Order to appear before the Juvenile Court was signed by Judge Wilson on August 
21, 2000. (TR 364-365) The Order to Show Cause Hearing was held on 
September 6, 2000. (TR 467-468) The hearing was to be a bifurcated hearing. 
The first segment of the hearing was on the Motion to Quash and the Juvenile 
Court jurisdictional issues. After the Juvenile Court ruled on the Motion to Quash, 
the Scott's notified the Juvenile Court of their intent to Appeal. The Scott's 
motioned the Juvenile Court to stay the proceedings pending the appeal. (TR 
00467) The Juvenile Court denied the motion. (TR 00467) Over the Scott's 
objection, the Juvenile Court proceeded to act on its assertion of jurisdiction. The 
juvenile court required ongoing visitation and ordered an investigation into the 
suspected sexual abuse by the grandfather. 
The Scott's presented the Juvenile Court with an Order denying the Motion. 
That Order separated the jurisdiction issue from the ongoing visitation and custody 
related issues. The Juvenile Court refused to sign the Order Denying the Motion to 
Quash. (TR 507-511) Instead, the Juvenile Court directed the parties to prepare 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order. The parties did so and jointly 
submitted the documents to the Court. The court declined to sign the jointly 
proposed order. (TR 520-525) The Court prepared its own Findings, Conclusions 
and Order. The Court's Order inappropriately mixes the resolved jurisdiction 
issue with the ongoing visitation and custody issues. 
The Hardingers' brief to the Court of Appeals agreed that the parties need 
resolution, but that jurisdiction can't be conferred on the appellate courts by 
stipulation. Judge Wilson stated on the record that the issues in this case need 
appellate direction. Prior to the decision by the Court of Appeals, the Juvenile 
Court entered an Order staying all proceedings in Juvenile Court until resolution of 
the Appeal. Since the Court of Appeals' decision, no actions have been taken in 
the Juvenile Court because the Juvenile Court does not have jurisdiction. 
The Hardingers cite, Little v. Mitchell 604 P.2d 918,919 (Utah 1979) as 
controlling authority that the issue is not ripe for appeal. However, Little was 
before the Court in a procedurally different context. The Little case was before the 
Court on an appeal based on the Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification. In that 
case, there were multiple claims brought by Plaintiffs against the State of Utah. 
The State moved to dismiss on the grounds of Sovereign Immunity. A claim of 
Sovereign Immunity requires factual findings and the case was not ready for 
appeal. However, in this case, the factual findings have been made. By affirming 
the Court of Appeal's reversal of the Juvenile Court's assertion of jurisdiction this 
case will be resolved. In Little there was no final judgment. The case should not 
have been before the Court of Appeals. Therefore, in this matter, In re: B.B., there 
is a final judgment which is ripe for review. 
The Hardingers cite, R.H.D. v. S.F. (In re Baby K), 967 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). In R.H.D. the Appellant sought to appeal a denial of his Motion to 
Dismiss and his Motion to Reconsider. In R.H.D. the Juvenile Court had not 
entered an adoption. There was not a final order to be appealed from and the Court 
of Appeals was correct to strike the appeal and send it back to the lower court for 
resolution. 
The Hardinger's also cite A.J. Mackay co. v. Oakland Construction 
Company, 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991) as controlling authority for dismissal of the 
Appeal. A.J. Mackay is also not on point. In A.J Mackay the parties took an 
appeal while an underlying counterclaims were still pending. However, in the 
present case, there is no counter-claim to the Motion to Quash. The Juvenile Court 
has improperly asserted jurisdiction. 
The Hardingers declare that resolution is necessary on one hand but continue 
to contest jurisdiction on the other hand. The Hardingers refuse to take action to 
clear up the jurisdictional issues.1 The Hardingers allege there are remaining 
issues of on going visitation, make up visitation and costs. Resolution of these all 
hinge on whether the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction. 
A. THE COURT COULD TREAT THIS AS AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
In Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 (Utah 1986) this court stated that, "In 
extraordinary cases, we may choose to treat a purported [appellate rule 3 appeal of 
right] as an interlocutory appeal under [appellate rule 5]." At 808. Although no 
reported cases since Williams have taken this course of action, it would be 
appropriate in this case. 
If the Juvenile Court would have entered a final order pursuant to 54(b) or 
granted a motion for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 5, the issues before 
the Court of Appeals and this Court would be the same. The Findings and Order 
appealed from would have been the same. The Statement of Facts would have 
been the same. The Question of Law would have been the same. The issues raised 
would have been the same. The need for an immediate appeal would have been 
1
 While Hardingers argument is correct that the parties cannot agree to jurisdiction, the Hardingers could agree to 
dismiss, without prejudice the pending matters in the juvenile court. If this court finds jurisdiction, the pending 
issues can be re-filed with the juvenile court. If this court finds no jurisdiction, the matter is resolved. 
An Appeal could be taken and the dispute between the parties resolved. 
the same. The parties needed direction from the Court of Appeals whether to drop 
all litigation in the Juvenile Court or to continue litigating. The Hardingers 
maintain the following issues are remaining: make up visitation; a change of 
custody2; more specific orders relating to phone visitation, and; re-imbursement for 
counseling costs. These determinations hinge on whether the juvenile court has 
jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issue should now be decided. 
Had the Scotts felt the issue was not ripe or had the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the case on the Hardinger's Rule 10 Motion for Summary Disposition it 
is likely the Court of Appeals would have granted a Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal or the Juvenile Court would have granted a URCP 54(b) Motion for a final 
judgment. 
The issues raised now are no different than the issues that will be raised. 
While the Scotts appealed this Juvenile Court's Order, the Hardingers continued 
relying on the Orders. The Hardingers exercised visitation pursuant to the Juvenile 
Court's Order until the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the Order. Since then, 
2
 The Scotts maintain that a change of custody would not be allowed as the parties are no longer the same. An Order 
related to the custody of Baylie Blundell would be of no effect as in the eyes of the law she no longer exists. If the 
Court could change custody, the Hardingers now have to overcome the parental presumption afforded the Scotts. 
the Scotts have been allowing visitation, as they believe it to be in Baylie's best 
interest. 
The necessity for immediate resolution is clear. Baylie is almost seven years 
old. She has been at the heart of litigation since she was less than two. If the 
appeal is dismissed for lack of a final judgment to appeal from, the parties will 
return to Juvenile Court. The requests made by the Hardingers will be granted or 
denied. The matter will then be brought before the Court of Appeals for another 
decision. 
POINT II 
THE SCOTT'S EFFECTIVELY APPEALED FROM THE AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
A. NOTICES OF APPEAL ARE TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED 
The Notice of Appeal in this case was filed within 30 days of Judge Wilson 
issuing a decision. The Notice of Appeal notified the Hardingers of the Scotts 
intent to appeal. This notice should be liberally construed to include the assertion 
of jurisdiction and the award of attorney's fees based on that assertion. See, 
Roberson v. Draney, 54 Utah 525,182 P 212,213 (1919). Notice had been given 
to the Hardingers in open court, before the entry of the judgment for attorney's 
fees. A court without jurisdiction in the first place certainly has no jurisdiction to 
enter an award of attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals was correct in reaching 
this issue. Even if the Notice of Appeal was not a model of clarity, the Hardingers 
did not rely on the notice to their detriment. 
B. THE JUVENILE COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY 
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
On October 24,2000 the Juvenile Court entered an award of attorney's fees 
in favor of the Hardingers against the Scotts in the amount of $2,795.17. The 
Order does not make Findings of Fact or reach Conclusions of Law upon which the 
Order and Judgment are granted. For the Juvenile Courts failure to make 
appropriate Findings of Fact alone, the Order and Judgment the Court of Appeals 
was correct in reversing the award. 
The Juvenile Court did not take evidence and could not have made sufficient 
findings to support the Order and Judgment. The Juvenile Court's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 24, 2000, fail as a matter of 
law. 
They did attempt to execute on the attorney fee judgment. Judge Wilson denied their attempt and issued a stay of 
all proceedings pending resolution by the Court of Appeals. 
Civil contempt of Court is a serious matter. Contempt of Court in the United 
States is based on English Common Law. For some types of contempt the 
legislature has enacted statutes. Contempt of Court is either direct when 
committed in the presence of the Court or indirect when committed outside the 
presence of the Court. Indirect contempt is at issue in the case on review. 
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) this court established 
the standard for contempt: 
Indirect contempt, in contrast to direct contempt, can 
properly be adjudged only in a proceeding more tightly 
hedged about with procedural protections. The due 
process provision of the federal constitution requires 
that in a prosecution for a contempt not committed in 
the presence of the court, "the person charged be 
advised of the nature of the action against him [or her], 
have assistance of counsel, if requested, have the right 
to confront witnesses, and have the right to offer 
testimony on his [or her] behalf." Burgers v. Maiben, 
652 P.2d at 1322; see U.S. Const, amend. XIV; cf. 
Robinson v. City Court ex rel. City of Ogden. 112 Utah 
at 42, 185 P.2d at 259 (applying Utah Const, art. I, §12 
to criminal contempt proceedings). These protections 
are amplified upon in the Code, which requires, inter 
alia, that in a case of indirect contempt, an affidavit 
must be presented to the court reciting the facts 
constituting the contempt in order to ensure that the 
court and the person charged are informed of the 
conduct alleged to be contemptuous. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-23-3 (1987); Robinson, 112 Utah at 41, 185 P.2d at 
258." VonHake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
The Juvenile Court failed to provide the Scotts procedural due process. The 
Scotts were not allowed to call witnesses. The Scotts were not allowed to testify. 
The Scotts were not allowed to examine the witnesses against them. The Scotts 
requested all of the above to preserve the error for review by both the Court of 
Appeals and now this Court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
JUVENILE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER POST 
ADOPTION ORDERS 
The child, Baylie, first came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in 
February of 1999 when the Baylie was only two years old and in diapers. Baylie is 
now in first grade and learning to read. The juvenile court obtained jurisdiction 
because Baylie's biological parents were neglecting her. Nick and Jenifer Blundell 
were spending more time in jail than out of jail. Baylie couldn't wait for her 
parents to get their lives straightened out. Neither could society. The Guardian Ad 
Litem realized this and sought termination of parental rights to assure that Baylie 
had permanency. Now Baylie has stable parents who love her very much and care 
for her. Her adoptive parents seek to do what is best for Baylie. That includes 
some on going contact with Susan and Garth Hardinger. That does not mean 
midweek visits every week, every other weekend, every other holiday and over 
half of the vacation days from school. The parties do not even live in close 
geographical proximity anymore. It is time to end the litigation and allow Baylie a 
chance to thrive in her new family at the direction of her parents.4 
The juvenile court's jurisdiction was warranted and appropriately provided 
for Baylie's needs. The juvenile court's jurisdiction ended upon entry of the 
Decree of Adoption. The Adoption has not been modified, appealed, set aside or 
even re-opened. The parties are in post adoption roles and have post adoption 
rights. Baylie's former aunt and uncle are now her legal parents. Baylies's former 
grandparents are replaced with new grandparents.5 The court has Decreed that the 
Scotts are Baylie's parents and now this Court should support the Scott's as 
parents. 
The Court of Appeals decision in this matter is a correct statement of the 
law: 
4
 A majority in Troxel v. Granville (which will be discussed in detail infra.)noted that prolonged litigation over a 
visitation petition may become an unacceptable burden on the parent's right to make decisions for his/her children. 
(See plurality and Kennedy opinions, 530 U.S. at 75, 101, 120 S.Ct. at 2065, 2079.) Specifically, when such 
litigation becomes "disruptive of the parent-child relationship," it may violate constitutional protections. 
Presumably other disruptions of the parent-child relationship also violate these protections. The Scotts submit that 
the circumstances of this litigation fit this pattern. Thus even if the court finds the visitation order was enforceable 
when entered, it may no longer be enforceable on its face in light of the Troxel decision. 
5
 While legally die Hardingers are no longer Baylie's grandparents, The Scotts recognize Baylie should have on 
going contact with them because they are important to Baylie. 
"Hence, the dispositive issue is whether a decree of adoption is an "order of 
the court" that terminates the juvenile court's jurisdiction. To resolve this 
issue, we turn first to the plain language of Utah's juvenile court statutes and 
adoption statutes. See State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149,151 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) ("[T]he primary consideration in statutory construction is 'to give 
effect to the legislature's intent. To discover that intent, this court looks first 
to the plain language of the statute.'" (Citation omitted.)); see also Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19,117,5 P.3d 616 ("The plain language of a statute is to 
be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other 
provisions in the same statute and 'with other statutes under the same and 
related chapters.'" (Citation omitted.)). 
112 Utah's juvenile courts are creatures of statute, and thus are courts of 
limited jurisdiction. See In re adoption of Trimble, 16 Utah 2d 188,398 P.2d 
25, 26 (1965); InreS.L., 1999 UT App 390,^52,995 P.2d 17 (Wilkins, P.J., 
concurring). Because they are courts of limited jurisdiction, juvenile courts 
are allowed to do only what the legislature has expressly authorized. See In 
re S.L., 1999 UT App 390 at 152 (stating juvenile court "powers are 
necessarily limited"). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104 describes the bases for 
the juvenile court's original jurisdiction. In this case, the juvenile court 
acquired jurisdiction over B.B. because she was allegedly abused and 
neglected. See id. § 78-3a-104(l)(c). The juvenile court ultimately granted 
the guardian ad litem's petition to terminate the parental rights of B.B.'s 
biological parents. See id. § 78-3a-411. At that point, B.B. had no legal 
parents and the juvenile court had jurisdiction until a permanent custody 
order or adoption was achieved. See id. § 78-3a-104(l)(c). Once the juvenile 
court granted the Parents' petition for adoption, the original basis for 
jurisdiction over B.B. ceased to exist because B.B. was no longer an abused 
or neglected child and permanency had been achieved. See generally Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-312 to -313 (Supp. 2001). 
S[13 Based on the above statutory provisions, this court has held 
that visitation rights of both biological parents and grandparents 
end upon termination of parental rights. See In re A.B., 1999 UT 
App 315,<P1, 991 P.2d 70 ("Grandmother's visitation rights 
were extinguished by operation of law when the court 
terminated her child's parental rights."); Kasper v. Nordfelt, 815 
P.2d 747,751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[Wjhere a child has been 
released [for adoption] any visitation rights of the child's natural 
family end with the initiation of such adoption proceedings."). 
The Hardingers assert that this is a case about the juvenile court's retained 
authority to enforce valid orders.6 As noted in a footnote of the Court of Appeals 
decision, the Hardingers cited Cramer v. Petrie, 637 N.E.2d 882 (Ohio 1994), for 
the proposition that allowing the Parents to disregard the Pre-adoption Visitation 
Order encourages disobedience of juvenile court orders. Cramer was appropriately 
distinguished because in Cramer the party sought enforcement of a child support 
order that was violated prior to the child's emancipation, although the enforcement 
action commenced after emancipation. See id. at 883. Unlike in this case, there was 
6
 In light of the Troxel decision, the prior order that grants visitation to Hardingers may not be 
enforceable. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has now indicated that Troxel is by no means 
limited to Washington State or to statutes as broad as Washington's former statute. In Dodge v. 
Graville. 150 L.Ed.2d 745, Cause No. 00-1300, by order issued June 29,2001, the Court granted 
certiorari and summarily vacated and remanded an Arizona order, requiring that the order be 
reconsidered in light of Troxel. The order in question had applied to the grandparent visitation 
context one or more Arizona statutes normally used in post-divorce situations when one parent 
has alienated the child's affections from the other parent. By vacating and remanding the trial 
court's order, with specific instructions for the Arizona Court of Appeal to apply Troxel, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has indicated that Troxel applies to orders other than initial grandparent visitation 
orders and in states where the statutory requirements for obtaining a grandparent visitation order 
are significantly greater than in Troxel itself. 
not a later order that effectively vacated the prior order. So long as new orders do 
not issue, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to enforce its valid orders. This 
case is not about retained jurisdiction to enforce valid orders. This case is about 
the effect of a Decree of Adoption on a prior order that was valid when entered. 
The law creating the court's authority to enter a Decree of Adoption is clear. 
Specifically, U.C.A. §78-30-9, which states: 
"The court shall examine each person appearing before it in 
accordance with this chapter, separately, and, if satisfied that the 
interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, it shall 
enter a final decree of adoption declaring that the child is 
adopted by the adoptive parent or parents and shall be regarded 
and treated in all respects as the child of the adoptive parent or 
parents." (emphasis added) 
Adoptions establish finality in the best interest of a child. An adoption may 
not be contested after the final decree of adoption is entered. U.C.A. §78-30-
4.16(3). The Hardingers can't contest the adoption so instead they seek to ignore 
the adoption and continue enforcing the guardianship order. 
The Court of Appeals relied on appropriate precedent. Kasper v. Nordfelt, 
815 P.2d 747 (Utah App. 1991). In Kasper a young unmarried mother gave birth 
to a child. The mother then gave the child to LDS Social Services so the child 
could be adopted. LDS Social Services placed the child with prospective adoptive 
parents who filed for adoption. The Grandparents sought to intervene in the 
process and filed a competing Petition for Adoption or in the alternative 
Guardianship. The Grandparents were granted temporary custody. During the 
proceedings the temporary custody was transferred to the foster parents who 
ultimately adopted the child. The grandparents appealed the denial of their 
visitation and adoption petitions. The appellate court held regarding the 
Grandparents' petition for visitation or custody: 
"Although ... under some circumstances family relationships 
might be of such a nature that their application to adopt should 
be given consideration, we do not find such a circumstance 
here, where the only living parent of the child deliberately and 
thoughtfully decided to place the child for adoption with an • 
agency, and not with the paternal grandparents. We think the 
integrity of such a decision, involving a critically important 
parental right, must be preserved, not only for the stability and 
well being of the child, but also for the protection for the 
adoption process and its purposes. As the Wilson court pointed 
out: (emphasis added) 
If the law recognized any right of custody beyond the parents, 
the number of potential protestants, such as grandparents, 
brothers and sisters of the parents (aunts and uncles of the 
child), or immediate relatives, would create a situation so 
fraught with possibilities for troubles as to make the placement 
of children difficult if not entirely impractical, a result which we 
agree should be avoided. Wilson v. Family Servs. Div„ 554 
P.2d 227,229 (Utah 1976)." 
Having established the basic tenants of the concept of adoption, the Kasper 
court further discusses the proper application of finality when a party seeks 
visitation post-adoption. Kasper specifically addresses this problem: 
[The] Grandparent visitation statute [is] not intended to indirectly 
liberalize the strictly worded adoption statute; Mitchell v. Doe,_41 
Wn.App. 846,706 P.2d 1100,1102-03 (1985) (the legislature did not 
intend that the statute regarding visitation rights of noncustodial 
parents or others to alter the protection afforded adopted children and 
their new families from disturbances by the child's natural family). 
For other examples, see L.F.M. v. Department of Social Services, 67 
Md.App. 379,507 A.2d 1151,1154,1156-57 (1986);.... 
In addition, the adoption statute suggests that grandparent visitation 
cannot carry over into an adoption where all other rights of the 
natural family have been extinguished. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-9 
(Supp. 1991) (after adoption, "child shall be regarded and treated in all 
respects as the child of the adoptive parent or parents."); Utah Code 
Ann. §78-30-10 (Supp. 1991) ("After that decree of adoption is 
entered, the adoptive parent or parents and the child shall sustain the 
legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights and be subject 
to all the duties of that relation." (Emphasis added) 
In the case of In Re Adoption of A.B., 991 P.2d 70,76 (1999), the case 
Kasper is revisited. The termination of the natural parents' parental rights also 
terminated the grandmother's rights to exercise grandparent visitation. Id. 
Additionally, the A.B. court adds in a footnote that "[visitation between 
grandmother and the children is now at the discretion of the adoptive parents." Id. 
This footnote is directly on point in the case under review. The former 
grandparents do not have a legally enforceable right to visit. Here the Scotts, as 
parents, have and likely will continue to allow visitation. The Scotts are seeking 
protection of their parental rights. 
A.B. points out in footnote one, supra, that the visitation of the children and 
the grandparent in that case was to be left to the parents discretion. Parents are 
expected to exercise discretion. Society goes to great lengths to protect 
fundamental parental rights. Significant procedural safeguards are in place to 
protect these rights. Once those rights are terminated, new rights need to be 
created. In the case under review, the Scott's parental rights recognized by the 
Court of Appeals and those rights should also be affirmed by this Court. 
It is the law of Utah that an adoption terminates the rights of previous, 
natural, family members. The logic behind this law is beyond reproach, and yet 
the petitioners want to force Baylie Scott to accept a duality. In essence, the law 
has legally cloned her and placed Baylie Scott/Blundell in a position where she 
lives in two different periods of time. Baylie Blundell as the first person, a pre-
adoptive individual, has been ordered by this court to associate with and to 
maintain a relationship with her biological mother and with her biological 
grandparents. Yet Baylie Scott is supposed to integrate into her new family and be 
a sibling to Tausha and Zachary Scott. 
Not only is this a confusing set of facts frustrating to a young child, but the 
adoptive parents, Kenneth and Kimberly Scott, are forced to endure a similar 
duality. At one point the Scotts were asked, by the Juvenile Court, if they would 
accept Baylie as their own child. The Scotts were asked to treat her in all respects 
as their natural daughter. They were asked to provide for Baylie, to care for 
Baylie, and to be Baylie's parents. If the Scotts were to divorce, Kenneth would be 
required to pay child support; the Hardingers would not. In 1991 Kenneth made a 
jump into parenthood the first time by adopting his step children, Tausha and 
Zachary Scott. In that adoption, the natural parents and grandparents do not have 
rights to visitation. 
The Scotts are required by law to accept the rights and responsibilities of 
adoptive parents. While being required to make the psychological jump into 
parenthood, the Scotts are at the same time expected to be "non-parents" according 
to a prearranged visitation schedule. Thus, these adoptive parents are being 
required to comply with a visitation order and turn their daughter over to the 
Hardingers for visitation without their rights to determine if said visitation is 
appropriate for their child. This is not a situation that any non-divorced natural 
parent would be forced to endure. The Juvenile Court has created an unworkable 
situation where parents have been created, yet the Guardians have not been 
terminated. 
In this case Kenneth and Kimberly Scott, by law have all of the rights, 
powers, and privileges of a natural parents except on every other weekend, every 
other birthday, every other Fourth of July, every other Thanksgiving, and every 
other Christmas. Essentially then, every other important event in Baylie's family 
life is not spent with her new legally recognized family. This duality cannot 
continue. Either Kenneth and Kimberly Scott must be allowed to be parents-in-
fact and not just quasi parents-in-law, or the concepts of adoption law will be re-
written by this Court. 
A. The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Troxel v. Granville is 
controlling 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of parental rights 
versus third parties be they grandparents or not. So long as a parent adequately 
cares for his or her children . . . there will normally be no reason for the State to 
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of 
that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's 
children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69,120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061 (2000). 
As parents, the Scotts have made a decision to limit the amount of time that Baylie 
spends with the Hardingers. Moreover, Troxel acknowledged that the desirability 
of any grandparent-grandchild contact is for the parent to judge: 
In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds 
between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, 
however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether 
such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any 
specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit 
parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial 
review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the 
parent's own determination. 530 U.S. at 68-69,120 S. Ct. at 2062, 
emphasis added. 
The Scotts have the right to make this determination. Even if they made a 
different determination before becoming Baylie's parents, they have that right now 
as her parents to decide what is in her best interest. Raising a child is not a static 
event. It requires flexibility and responsiveness to a child's needs. The courts are 
not equipped to make these daily decisions. A child's concept of time does not 
allow for studied review by a court. The court presumes the parental decision is 
correct and has a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody 
and control of their children. Id., See, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399,401, 
43 S.Ct. 625 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 
1388 (1982), InreS.A.v.State. 2001 Utah Ct.App. 307, 37 P.3d 1166. 
In Parham, et al. v. J.R., et al.. 442 U.S. 584, at 602-603, (1979) the U.S. 
Supreme Court summarized in the clearest terms the bedrock legal principle that 
parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests. 
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess 
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment 
required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it 
has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best 
interests of their children That some parents "may at times be acting 
against the interests of their children"... creates a basis for caution, but is 
hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that 
teach that parents generally do act in the child's best interests.... The statist 
notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all 
cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to 
American tradition." 
Similarly, in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 446, at 450, 110 S.Ct. 2926 
(1990), the United States Supreme Court noted that "the State has no legitimate 
interest in questioning one parent's judgment... or in presuming that the parent 
who has assumed parental duties is incompetent to make decisions regarding the 
health and welfare of the child."7 Troxel v. Granville, as discussed above, is the 
7
 Hodgson reaffirmed "the parental right... to assess independently, for their minor child, what 
will serve that child's best interest." Id. at 453. See also Smith, et al. v. Organization of Foster 
latest U.S. Supreme Court case to reaffirm these principles, though the first to 
apply them in the nonparent visitation context. 
It takes only a little thought to see that this deference to parental decision-
making is a necessity. How many decisions must a parent make every day, every 
week, every year, in raising a child? Who can count how many of those decisions 
will change a child's life for good or ill, and to how great an extent those decision 
will make? If state governments are to begin second-guessing these decisions, 
where shall they begin? And where will it end?8 
[L]aw does not have the capacity to supervise the delicately complex 
interpersonal bonds between parent and child. As parens patriae the state is 
too crude an instrument to become an adequate substitute for parents. The 
legal system has neither the resources nor the sensitivity to respond to a 
growing child's ever-changing needs and demands. It does not have the 
capacity to deal on an individual basis with the consequences of its decisions 
or to act with the deliberate speed required by a child's sense of time and 
essential to its well being. Even if the law were not so incapacitated, there is 
no basis for assuming that the judgments of its decision makers about a 
Families [hereinafter OFFER], 431 U.S. 816, 841, n. 44 (1977), noting that child's interests are 
usually represented in litigation by parents or guardians; Santosky v Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at 
760: " . . . the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversaries." 
8
 See Noll v. Noll, 98 N.Y.S.2d 938,940 (App.Div. 1950), warning of the difficulties should 
judges "tell parents how to bring up their children." It should be noted that Noll involved a 
single parent (widow). 
particular child's needs would be any better than (or indeed as good as) the 
judgment of his parents.9 
A parent's decision to cut off or restrict contact with a grandparent is the last 
act in a years-long drama. In Parham's words, "neither state officials nor federal 
courts are equipped to review such parental decisions." Supra, 442 U.S. at 604. 
For this reason, only the clearest and most exceptional evidence can properly rebut 
the presumption in favor of the parent's decision. "Clearly, forced, extensive 
unsupervised visitation cannot be ordered absent compelling circumstances which 
suggest something near unfitness of the custodial parents." Stacy v. Ross, No. 
1999-CA-00579-SCT (Miss. 10/31/2001). 
In this matter, upon the entry of the Decree of Adoption, a new child was 
born in the eyes of the law. A new birth certificate was issued. A new social 
security card and number were issued. For all purposes the Scotts became Baylie's 
parents. With that new mantle placed upon them came new responsibilities and the 
Scotts had a paradigm shift. The Scott's began treating Baylie like their child and 
acting as her parents. There is no going back to the way it was before the adoption. 
9
 Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental 
Autonomy, 86 Yale L. J. 645, 650 (1977). 
This Court should affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals that effectuates The 
Decree of Adoption that has been in place for almost three years. No appeal has 
been taken from the adoption nor may it now be set aside. 
B. UTAH STATUTES AND PUBLIC POLICY DO NOT SUPPORT 
OPEN ADOPTIONS 
Open adoptions may be appropriate and may be allowed in other 
jurisdictions. Utah does not have open adoptions. Open Adoptions are the 
province of the legislature. If the legislature decides to create open adoptions, 
those rights can be tested at an appropriate time. Utah has enacted a modified 
grandparent visitation statute that purports to allow grandparent visitation post 
adoption. When the grandparent statute is reviewed it may or may not withstand 
judicial scrutiny. However, this is not a grandparent visitation case.10 Courts in 
Alabama, Florida, Ohio and Illinois have struck down grandparent visitation all 
during year 2001n after the United State's Supreme Court decision in Troxel v. 
10
 Now is not the time and this is not the case to determine the constitutionality of the Utah 
grandparent statute. If the Court determines this issue is before the Court, the Scott's request 
leave to file a brief on that issue and to request friend of the court briefs to be filed. The issue of 
the constitutionality of grandparent visitation will take more pages to brief than are allotted by 
the Rules of appellate procedure. 
11
 Langman v. Langman, 111. App.3d (2001) www.loislaw.com Case Number 3-
00-0684, State of Kansas, Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services V. Paillet, 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57,120 S.Ct. 2054 (US 2000). The Langman case is 
especially illustrative of the Scott's position as the case has many factual 
similarities to the case at bar. In Langman the dispute was between adoptive 
parents and grandparents who had raised the child for part of the child's life. The 
Court held the statute unconstitutional and provided as follows: 
"In contrast to parental rights, a grandparent's right to visitation is a 
recent statutory creation and is not a fundamental right on an equal 
footing with the right of a parent. This statute does not require a 
showing that the child will be harmed if grandparent visitation is 
not granted. The statute provides no factors for the court to consider 
in its analysis and no mandate that the court make findings of fact. 
There is no presumption in favor of the fit parents' decision. "The 
Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the 
fundamental rights to make childrearing decisions simply because a 
state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." Troxel, 530 
U.S. at 72-73,120 S.Ct. at 2064. With the goal of adoption being to 
create new, presumably more stable, familial bonds, a statute 
infringing upon the new parents' rights must be narrowly tailored in 
a manner least restrictive of the parents' rights. Although the statute 
in Troxel was broader than § 26—1OA-30, in that it allowed "any 
person" to ask for visitation, the Supreme Court's holding was not 
based on the fact that "any person" could petition for visitation, but, 
rather, was based on grandparents' visitation rights. In other words, 
the statute was not held facially unconstitutional, but was held 
Kan. , 16 P.3d 962 (KS 2001), J.S v. D.W.. So.2d . (Ala.Civ. App. 5-4-
2001) Lois Law Number: 2990431, Blair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. 
2001). These cases cite to numerous decisions upholding and striking down grandparent 
visitation. There is not room in this brief to fully address the issue. 
unconstitutional as applied. In the present case, § 26-10A-30, as 
applied, is unconstitutional, because it infringes upon J.S. and E.S. 
's fundamental right to parent." 
Utah adoption policy is the province of the legislature. Interpretation and 
enforcement of the policy as enacted into law is the province of the judiciary. The 
Hardingers cite In re Adoption of Hallowav, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) for the 
proposition that the Utah Supreme Court has articulated a policy in favor of open 
adoptions. In fact, the language quoted by the Hardinger's supports the Scott's 
position as well as the Court of Appeals ruling. This court in Hallowav stated in 
footnote 11 to the majority opinion: 
[fnl 1] An innovative approach to adoption called an open 
adoption, is gaining increased recognition among professionals in 
the adoption field and may be suited to this case. A fundamental 
concept of an open adoption is to allow some communication 
between adoptive and natural parents and, when appropriate, to 
permit communication between the natural parent and the child as 
the child grows up. See generally S. Arms, To Love and Let Go 
(1973). This approach presents some creative possibilities in the 
instant case: an arrangement might be reached which would allow 
Jeremiah to remain with his adoptive parents but also would 
permit the tribe to teach the child about his Indian heritage. We 
make this statement as an observation only, recognizing that the 
matter is not ours to decide." [Emphasis Added]. 
Given Utah's closed adoption paradigm, the appellate courts have gone to 
great lengths to find ways around closed adoptions. The Court in T.S. v. L.F. 2001 
Utah Ct. App Adv. Rpt. 183 found the adoption was not final so the father's 
parental rights were not terminated. T.S. is distinguished from Baylie's case 
because in this matter all parties entitled to notice were given notice. The Decree 
of Adoption has been in place for almost three years. 
The Hardingers ask this Court to find the Court of Appeals was wrong and 
then take the next step and enter a decision with far reaching ramifications. This 
Court addresses questions in the process of settling specific controversies between 
parties. More important than the outcome of this case for the litigants are the 
broader effects of the legal rules that will result from this court's opinion. If this 
Court accepts the position of the Hardingers, a new form of judicially created 
adoptions will be created. Rather than the legislatively created closed adoptions, 
open adoption will then be allowed. Parents who are contemplating giving up their 
child for adoption or are facing termination of parental rights may require of the 
adopting parents a "pre-adoption contract." This contract could require the 
adoptive parents to provide post adoption visitation to the birth parents. These 
"pre-adoption contracts" are not currently allowed in Utah. The legislature has not 
made a provision for open adoptions. The legislature relies on the adoptive parents 
to make decisions in the best interest of the child. Once the adoptive parents come 
before the court and the court finds that, "the best interest of the child will be 
promoted by the adoption, a final decree of adoption enters declaring that the child 
is adopted by the adoptive parent or parents and shall be regarded and treated in all 
respects as the child of the adoptive parent or parents." 
The Juvenile Court chose adoption for Baylie. The Juvenile Court 
could have entered an order of permanent guardianship with rights of 
visitation to the Hardingers but that course of action comes with a risk of 
instability for the child. Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-l 18(2)(y)(i). The Juvenile 
Court decided upon adoption. Upon creation of a new parent child 
relationship, new rights are conferred and old rights are terminated. In this 
case, the Scotts became parents. The Scott's paradigm shifted. The 
Hardinger's visitation rights were vacated. The agreement entered into 
between the Scotts, as aunt and uncle, and the Hardingers was no longer 
enforceable.12 Rather than acting as guardians, the Scotts were now required 
by the Court to treat Baylie in all respects as a natural born child and act as 
If this court decide that the agreement is enforceable, the Scotts will proceed on their allegations that the 
Hardingers have not supported the Scotts in the adoption. Some of these allegations are already on file with the 
juvenile court. (JCR 454-466). 
her parents. Since the entry of the Decree of Adoption, no new grounds for 
juvenile court jurisdiction have occurred. 
C. THIS IS NOT A CONTRACT DISPUTE 
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the Hardinger's assertions that this 
case is about contract law. This is a case about the state invading the sanctity of 
the family. There is no doubt that a parent's right to make decisions relating to the 
child and whom the child visits with is a constitutionally protected fundamental 
liberty interest. In re S.A. v. State, 2001 UT App 307, 37 P.3d 1166 see also In re 
J.D.M., 808 P.2d 1122,1126 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) ("There is no dispute that the 
parent-child relationship is accorded constitutional protection."); In re M.A.V., 736 
P.2d 1031, 1033 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App. 1987) ("Of course, parents have a fundamental 
liberty interest in maintaining family relationships with their children."). In sum, 
father's "right to raise [his child] is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Campbell v. Campbell, 
896 P.2d 635,641 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
Hardingers assert this case is a simple contract case. Hardingers assert that a 
bargain was made and should be enforced. Assuming arguendo that the 
Hardinger's analogy is applicable, the analogy fails. The asserted contract is void 
abinitio. The argument is that the parties contracted into an agreement for post 
adoption visitation. Utah Statutes provide that adoptions create new parental rights 
and are final. In this case, those new parental rights create a new child and vest in 
the Scott's parental rights. By virtue of the abuse and or neglect Petition, filed in 
this case, the Juvenile Court had authority to enter the Order granting custody and 
guardianship to the Scotts. The Juvenile Court also had authority to enter a Decree 
of Adoption. What the Juvenile Court does not have authority to do is to enforce 
the pre-adoption visitation Order after the adoption nor is the party's agreement 
enforceable. 
The parties entered an agreement for Custody/Guardianship with visitation 
and the Hardinger's support for the Scott's to adopt. The parties voluntarily 
entered into this agreement and it was enforceable up to the point of the entry of 
the Decree of Adoption. A contract for post adoption visitation is comparable to a 
contract to enforce a gambling debt. In many jurisdictions, contracts to enforce 
gambling debts are against public policy and thus not enforceable. Resorts 
International Inc. v. Zonis, 577 F. Supp. 876 (Dist. Ct. N.D. 111. 1984) Boardwalk 
Regency v. Travelers Exp, 745 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D. Mich. 1990). In Utah, 
agreements for post adoption visitation are against the policy of the adoption 
statute and not enforceable. 
Secondly, even if the parties could enter the agreement, the Hardingers have 
not lived up to their end of the bargain. A failure of consideration argument goes 
both ways in this case. The Scotts allowed visitation post adoption. The post-
adoption visitation is what gave rise to the allegations that caused the visitation to 
be suspended. If the Court agrees this is a case of contract and the matter is 
returned to the Juvenile Court, evidence will be submitted showing the Hardinger's 
failure to "support the adoption." 
D. This Court Has Inherent Equity Power to Grant Appropriate Relief in 
This Situation 
Assuming the Hardinger's argument is correct, this is merely a contract case 
and they are entitled to the benefit of their bargain. The Juvenile Court, sitting as a 
court of equity has the inherent power to modify a judgment when changed 
circumstances make its prospective application inequitable. The visitation Order 
could be modified as appropriate, given the change in circumstances that has made 
13
 In both cases, the Courts relied on statutes to ascertain public policy. The public policy in this case is clearly set 
forth in the adoption statutes. Adoptions may not be contested after becoming final. U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(3) 
its prospective application both inequitable and contrary to law. Under the current 
judgment and orders based thereon, the Scotts bear the burden of visitation ordered 
without regard for the presumption that their decisions are in Baylie's best interest. 
No trial court bearing the Troxel opinions in mind may impose such an order on 
any other parents. It would be utterly inequitable to enforce this order on the 
Scotts while other parents, throughout Utah enjoy their full constitutional 
protections. 
At a minimum, it would be appropriate for this Court to review the findings 
and evidence submitted, and apply to those facts the principles newly explicated by 
a majority of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. Those principles, applied to 
those facts, would not leave the current visitation scheme untouched. 
The governing law has changed. It would be unconscionable to subject 
Baylie's family to prospective application, without reexamination, of a judgment 
that the Troxel decision calls into question. See In re T.J.K., No. 06-00-00163-CV 
(Tex. App. Dist.6 1 l/15/2001)(holding that parent's participation in agreed order 
did not waive constitutional issue as to non-parent visitation); Crafton v. Gibson, 
supra, 752 N.E.2d 78; Under v. Linder, supra, Arkansas Supreme Court. 
POINT IV 
THE SCOTTS SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 
The juvenile court committed error by asserting jurisdiction. The Scotts 
have been fighting this legal battle for almost three years the since Decree of 
Adoption was entered. The Hardingers have paid nothing towards the support of 
Baylie. The legal fees paid by the Scotts could otherwise have been used to 
provide for Baylie. The Court of Appeals did not award either side attorney fees. 
The Scotts request this Court award them their attorney fees on appeal. Utah 
Dep't. of Social Servs. V. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 Utah Ct. App 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals correctly found that Juvenile Court's Order was final 
and appealable. The Notice of Appeal was sufficient to encompass the attorney 
fees award. The Juvenile Court retains jurisdiction to enforce its own valid orders. 
The order awarding the Hardinger's visitation is no longer enforceable. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the Juvenile Court's erroneous assertion 
of jurisdiction and vacating the award of attorney fees should be sustained. 
DATED this *-*-*- day of January, 2003. 
Brook J. Sessions 
Attorney the parents 
ADDENDUM; 
CONTROLLING RULES 
Rule> <3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
<a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal 
may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate 
court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and 
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the 
time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step 
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not 
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are 
entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests 
are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint 
notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after 
filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may 
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon 
its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of 
the parties to the separate appeals. 
<c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall 
be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. 
The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in 
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the 
appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, 
the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall 
specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate 
the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall 
designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall 
designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal 
shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving 
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each 
party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not 
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed 
with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the 
certificate of service shall designate the name of the party 
represented by that counsel. 
<f) Filing fee[s] in civil appeals. At the time of 
filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a 
civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of 
the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of 
the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the 
filing fee is paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of 
appeal and payment of the required fee, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice 
of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy of the bond 
required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond 
has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt 
of the copy of the notice of appeal, tne clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, 
with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not 
contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to 
the title. 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an 
interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a 
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order 
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial 
court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. 
A timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54 (b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines is 
not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be 
considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission to 
appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may direct the 
appellant to file a petition that conforms to the requirements of 
paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to 
the Supreme Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court an original and five copies of the petition, 
together with the fee required by statute. For a petition 
presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals an original and four copies of 
the petition, together with the fee required by statute. The 
petitioner shall serve the petition on the opposing party and 
notice of the filing of the petition on the trial court. If an 
order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the 
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by 
mail to the respective parties and shall transmit a certified 
copy of the order, together with a copy of the petition, to the 
trial court where the petition and order shall be filed in lieu 
of a notice of appeal. 
(c) Content of petition. 
(1) The petition shall contain: 
(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of 
the issue presented and the order sought to be reviewed; 
(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail, and a 
demonstration that the issue was preserved in the trial court. 
Petitioner must state the applicable standard of appellate review 
and cite supporting authority; 
(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory 
appeal should be permitted, including a concise analysis of the 
statutes, rules or cases believed to be determinative of the 
issue stated; and 
(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially 
advance the termination of the litigation. 
(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court 
to the Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the 
Court of Appeals" shall appear immediately under the title of the 
document, i.e. Petition for Permission to Appeal Appellant may 
then set forth in the petition a concise statement why the 
Supreme Court should decide the case in light of the relevant 
factors listed in Rule 9(c)(7). 
(3) The petitioner shall attach a copy of the order of the 
trial court from which an appeal is sought and any related 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and opinion. 
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any 
other party may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. If 
the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the 
Court of Appeals, the answer may contain a concise response to 
the petitioner's contentions under Rule 5 (c)(5). An original 
and five copies of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original and four copies shall be filed in the Court of 
Appeals. The respondent shall serve the answer on the petitioner. 
The petition and any answer shall be submitted without oral 
argument unless otherwise ordered. 
(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order 
may be granted only if it appears that the order involves 
substantial rights and may materially affect the final decision 
or that a determination of the correctness of the order before 
final judgment will better serve the administration and interests 
of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the 
particular issue or point of law which will be considered and may 
be on such terms, including the filing of a bond for costs and 
damages, as the appellate court may determine. The clerk of the 
appellate court shall immediately give the parties and trial 
court notice by mail of any order granting or denying the 
petition. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed 
to have been filed and docketed by the granting of the petition. 
All proceedings subsequent to the granting of the petition shall 
be as, and within the time required, for appeals from final 
judgments except that no docketing statement shall be filed under 
Rule 9 unless the court otherwise orders. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1996; 
November 1, 1999.) 
Rule> <54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a 
decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need 
not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the 
record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than 
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
ADDENDUM: 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
?&>-<3a>-<104. Jurisdiction of juvenile court — Original — 
Exclusive. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has 
exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a minor who has violated any federal, state, or local law or 
municipal ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has 
violated any law or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, 
regardless 
of where the violation occurred, excluding traffic laws and boating and 
ordinances; 
(b) a person 21 years of age or older who has failed or refused to 
comply with an order of the juvenile court to pay a fine or 
restitution, 
if the order was imposed prior to the person's 21st birthday; however, 
the continuing jurisdiction is limited to causing compliance with 
existing orders; 
(c) a minor who is an abused child, neglected child, or dependent 
child, as those terms are defined in Section 78-3a-103; 
(d) a protective order for a minor who is alleged to be an abused 
child or neglected child, except as provided in Section 7S-3a-lQ5, and 
unless the petition is filed by a natural parent or stepparent of the 
minor against a natural parent or stepparent of the minor; 
(e) the determination of the custody of a minor or to appoint a 
guardian of the person or othei: guardian of a minor who comes within 
the 
court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this section; 
(f) the termination of the legal parent-child relationship in 
accordance with Part 4, Termination of Parental Rights Act, including 
termination of residual parental rights and duties; 
(g) the treatment or commitment of a mentally retarded minor; 
(h) a minor who is a habitual truant from school; 
(i) the judicial consent to the marriage of a minor under age 16 
upon a determination of voluntariness or where otherwise required by 
law, employment, or enlistment of a minor when consent is required by 
law; 
(j) any parent or parents of a minor committed to a secure youth 
corrections facility, to order, at the discretion of the court and on 
the recommendation of a secure youth corrections facility, the parent 
or parents of a minor committed to a secure youth corrections facility 
for a custodial term, to undergo group rehabilitation therapy under the 
direction of a secure youth corrections facility therapist, who has 
supervision of that parent's or parents1 minor, or any other therapist 
the court may direct, for a period directed by the court as recommended 
by a secure youth corrections facility; 
(k) a minor under Title 55, Chapter 12, Interstate Compact on 
Juveniles; 
(1) the treatment or commitment of a mentally ill child. The court 
may commit a child to the physical custody of a local mental health 
authority or to the legal custody of the Division of Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health in accordance with the procedures and requirements of 
Title 62A, Chapter 15, Part 7, Commitment of Persons Under Age 18 to 
Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health. The court may not 
commit a child directly to the Utah State Hospital; 
(m) the commitment of a minor in accordance with Section 62A-15-301; 
(n) de novo review of final agency actions resulting from an 
informal adjudicative proceeding as provided in Section 63-46b-15; and 
(o) adoptions conducted in accordance with the procedures described 
in Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption, when the juvenile court has 
previously entered an order terminating the rights of a parent and 
finds that adoption is in the best interest of the minor. 
(2) In addition to the provisions of Subsection (1)(a) the juvenile 
court has exclusive jurisdiction over any traffic or boating offense 
committed by a minor under 16 years of age and concurrent jurisdiction 
over all other traffic or boating offenses committed by a minor 16 
years of age or older, except that the court shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the following offenses committed by a minor under 18 
years of age: 
(a) Section 76-5-207, automobile homicide; 
(b) Section 41-6-44, operating a vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs; 
(c) Section 41-6-45, reckless driving or Section 73-18-12, reckless 
operation; 
(d) Section 41-la-1314, unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer for an extended period of time; and 
(e) Section 41-6-13.5 or 73-18-20, fleeing a peace officer. 
(3) The court also has jurisdiction over traffic and boating 
offenses that are part of a single criminal episode filed in a petition 
that contains an offense over which the court has jurisdiction. 
(4) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over questions of custody, 
support, parent-time, and visitation certified to it by the district 
court pursuant to Section 78-3a-105. 
(5) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over an ungovernable or 
runaway minor who is referred to it by the Division of Child and Family 
Services or by public or private agencies that contract with the 
division 
to provide services to that minor where, despite earnest and persistent 
efforts by the division or agency, the minor has demonstrated that he: 
(a) is beyond the control of his parent, guardian, lawful custodian, 
or school authorities to the extent that his behavior or condition 
endangers his own welfare or the welfare of others; or 
(b) has run away from home. 
(6) This section does not restrict the right of access to the 
juvenile court by private agencies or other persons. 
(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of all magistrate functions 
relative to cases arising under Section 78-3a-602. 
(8) The juvenile court has jurisdiction to make a finding of 
substantiated, unsubstantiated, or without merit, in accordance with 
Section 78-3a-320. 
75>-<3a>-<228. Adjudication of jurisdiction of juvenile court — 
Disposition of cases — Enumeration of possible court orders — 
Considerations of court — Obtaining DNA sample. 
(1) (a) When a minor is found to come within the provisions of 
Section 78-3a-104, the court shall so adjudicate. The court shall make 
a finding of the facts upon which it bases its jurisdiction over the 
minor. However, in cases within the provisions of Subsection 78-3a-
104(1), findings of fact are not necessary. 
(b) If the court adjudicates a minor for a crime of violence or an 
offense in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, it shall 
order that notice of the adjudication be provided to the school 
superintendent of the district in which the minor resides or attends 
school. Notice shall be made to the district superintendent within 
three days of the adjudication and shall include the specific offenses 
for which the minor was adjudicated. 
(2) Upon adjudication the court may make the following dispositions 
by court order: 
(a) (i) The court may place the minor on probation or under 
protective supervision in the minor's own home and upon conditions 
determined by the court, including compensatory service as provided in 
Section 78-11-20.7. 
(ii) The court may place the minor in state supervision with the 
probation department of the court, under the legal custody of: 
(A) his parent or guardian; 
(B) the Division of Youth Corrections; or 
(C) the Division of Child and Family Services. 
(iii) If the court orders probation or state supervision, the court 
shall direct that notice of its order be provided to designated persons 
in the local law enforcement agency and the school or transferee 
school, if applicable, which the minor attends. The designated persons 
may receive the information for purposes of the minor's supervision and 
student safety. 
(iv) Any employee of the local law enforcement agency and the school 
which the minor attends who discloses the courtfs order of probation is 
not: 
(A) civilly liable except when the disclosure constitutes fraud or 
malice as provided in Section 63-30-4; and 
(B) civilly or criminally liable except when the disclosure 
constitutes a knowing violation of Section 63-2-801. 
(b) The court may place the minor in the legal custody of a relative 
or other suitable person, with or without probation or protective 
supervision, but the juvenile court may not assume the function of 
developing foster home services. 
(c) (i) The court may: 
(A) vest legal custody of the minor in the Division of Child and 
Family Services, Division of Youth Corrections, or the Division of 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health; and 
(B) order the Department of Human Services to provide dispositional 
recommendations and services. 
(ii) For minors who may qualify for services from two or more 
divisions within the Department of Human Services, the court may vest 
legal custody with the department. 
(iii) (A) Minors who are committed to the custody of the Division of 
Child and Family Services on grounds other than abuse or neglect are 
subject to the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 3A, Minors in 
Custody on Grounds Other Than Abuse or Neglect, and Title 62A, Chapter 
4a, Part 2A, Minors in Custody on Grounds Other Than Abuse or Neglect. 
(B) Prior to the court entering an order to place a minor in the 
custody of the Division of Child and Family Services on grounds other 
than abuse or neglect, the court shall provide the division with notice 
of the hearing no later than five days before the time specified for 
the 
hearing so the division may attend the hearing. 
(C) Prior to committing a minor to the custody of the Division of 
Child and Family Services, the court shall make a finding as to what 
reasonable efforts have been attempted to prevent the minor's removal 
from his home. 
(d) (i) The court may commit the minor to the Division of Youth 
Corrections for secure confinement. 
(ii) A minor under the jurisdiction of the court solely on the 
ground of abuse, neglect, or dependency under Subsection 78-3a-
104(1)(c) may not be committed to the Division of Youth Corrections. 
(e) The court may commit the minor, subject to the court retaining 
continuing jurisdiction over him, to the temporary custody of the 
Division of Youth Corrections for observation and evaluation for a 
period not to exceed 45 days, which period may be extended up to 15 
days at the request of the director of the Division of Youth 
Corrections. 
(f) (i) The court may commit the minor to a place of detention or an 
alternative to detention for a period not to exceed 30 days subject to 
the court retaining continuing jurisdiction over the minor. This 
commitment may be stayed or suspended upon conditions ordered by the 
court. 
(ii) This Subsection (2)(f) applies only to those minors adjudicated 
for: 
(A) an act which if committed by an adult would be a criminal 
offense; or 
(B) contempt of court under Section 78-3a-901. 
(g) The court may vest legal custody of an abused, neglected, or 
dependent minor in the Division of Child and Family Services or any 
other 
appropriate person in accordance with the requirements and procedures 
of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
Proceedings. 
(h) The court may place the minor on a ranch or forestry camp, or 
similar facility for care and also for work, if possible, if the 
person, agency, or association operating the facility has been approved 
or has otherwise complied with all applicable state and local laws. A 
minor placed in a forestry camp or similar facility may be required to 
work on fire prevention, forestation and reforestation, recreational 
works, forest roads, and on other works on or off the grounds of the 
facility and may be paid wages, subject to the approval of and under 
conditions set by the court. 
(i) The court may order the minor to repair, replace, or otherwise 
make restitution for damage or loss caused by the minors wrongful act, 
including costs of treatment as stated in Section 78-3a-318 and impose 
fines in limited amounts. If a minor has been returned to this state 
under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, the court may order the 
minor to make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity 
for the return. 
(j) The court may issue orders necessary for the collection of 
restitution and fines ordered by the court, including garnishments, 
wage withholdings, and executions. 
(k) (i) The court may through its probation department encourage the 
development of employment or work programs to enable minors to fulfill 
their obligations under Subsection (2)(i) and for other purposes 
considered desirable by the court. 
<ii) Consistent with the order of the court, the probation officer 
may permit the minor found to be within the jurisdiction of the court 
to participate in a program of work restitution or compensatory service 
in lieu of paying part or all of the fine imposed by the court. 
(1) (i) In violations of traffic laws within the court's 
jurisdiction, the court may, in addition to any other disposition 
authorized by this section: 
(A) restrain the minor from driving for periods of time the court 
considers necessary; and 
(B) take possession of the minor's driver license. 
(ii) The court may enter any other disposition under Subsection 
(2)(1)(i); however, the suspension of driving privileges for an offense 
under Section 78-3a-506 are governed only by Section 78-3a-5Q6. 
(m) (i) When a minor is found within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 because of violating Section 58-
37-8, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, the court shall, in 
addition to any fines or fees otherwise imposed, order that the minor 
perform a minimum of 20 hours, but no more than 100 hours, of 
compensatory service. Satisfactory completion of an approved substance 
abuse prevention or treatment program may be credited by the court as 
compensatory service hours. 
(ii) When a minor is found within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court under Section 78-3a-104 because of a violation of Section 32A-12-
209 or Subsection 76-9-701(1), the court may, upon the first 
adjudication, and shall, upon a second or subsequent adjudication, 
order that the minor perform a minimum of 20 hours, but no more than 
100 hours of compensatory service, in addition to any fines or fees 
otherwise imposed. Satisfactory completion of an approved substance 
abuse prevention or treatment program may be credited by the court as 
compensatory service hours. 
(n) The court may order that the minor be examined or treated by a 
physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, or psychologist or that he receive 
other special care. For these purposes the court may place the minor 
in a hospital or other suitable facility. 
(o) (i) The court may appoint a guardian for the minor if it appears 
necessary in the interest of the minor, and may appoint as guardian a 
public or private institution or agency in which legal custody of the 
minor is vested. 
(ii) In placing a minor under the guardianship or legal custody of 
an individual or of a private agency or institution, the court shall 
give primary consideration to the welfare of the minor. When 
practicable, the court may take into consideration the religious 
preferences of the minor and of the minor's parents. 
(p) (i) In support of a decree under Section 78-3a-104, the court 
may order reasonable conditions to be complied with by the parents or 
guardian, the minor, the minor's custodian, or any other person who has 
been made a party to the proceedings. Conditions may include: 
(A) parent-time by the parents or one parent; 
(B) restrictions on the minor's associates; 
(C) restrictions on the minor's occupation and other activities; and 
(D) requirements to be observed by the parents or custodian, 
(ii) A minor whose parents or guardians successfully complete a 
family or other counseling program may be credited by the court for 
detention, confinement, or probation time. 
(q) The court may order the minor to be placed in the legal custody 
of the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health or committed to 
the physical custody of a local mental health authority, in accordance 
with the procedures and requirements of Title 62A, Chapter 15, Part 7, 
Commitment of Persons Under Age 18 to Division of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health. 
(r) (i) The court may make an order committing a minor within its 
jurisdiction to the Utah State Developmental Center if the minor has 
mental retardation in accordance with the provisions of Title 62A, 
Chapter 5, Part 3, Admission to Mental Retardation Facility. 
(ii) The court shall follow the procedure applicable in the district 
courts with respect to judicial commitments to the Utah State 
Developmental Center when ordering a commitment under Subsection 
(2) (r) (i) . 
(s) The court may terminate all parental rights upon a finding of 
compliance with the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4, 
Termination of Parental Rights Act. 
(t) The court may make any other reasonable orders for the best 
interest of the minor or as required for the protection of the public, 
except that a person younger than 18 years of age may not be committed 
to jail or prison. 
(u) The court may combine the dispositions listed in this section 
if they are compatible. 
(v) Before depriving any parent of custody, the court shall give due 
consideration to the rights of parents concerning their minor. The 
court may transfer custody of a minor to another person, agency, or 
institution in accordance with the requirements and procedures of Title 
78, Chapter 3a, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings. 
(w) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(y) <i), an order under this 
section for probation or placement of a minor with an individual or an 
agency shall include a date certain for a review of the case by the 
court. A new date shall be set upon each review. 
(x) In reviewing foster home placements, special attention shall be 
given to making adoptable minors available for adoption without delay. 
(y) (i) The juvenile court may enter an order of permanent custody 
and guardianship with a relative or individual of a minor where the 
court has previously acquired jurisdiction as a result of an 
adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency, excluding cases arising 
under Subsection 78-3a-105(4). 
(ii) Orders under Subsection (2)(y)(i): 
(A) shall remain in effect until the minor reaches majority; 
(B) are not subject to review under Section 78-3a-119; and 
(C) may be modified by petition or motion as provided in Section 
78-3a-903. 
(iii) Orders permanently terminating the rights of a parent, 
guardian, or custodian and permanent orders of custody and guardianship 
do not expire with a termination of jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
(3) In addition to the dispositions described in Subsection (2), 
when a minor comes within the court?s jurisdiction he may be given a 
choice by the court to serve in the National Guard in lieu of other 
sanctions, provided: 
(a) the minor meets the current entrance qualifications for service 
in the National Guard as determined by a recruiter, whose determination 
is final; 
(b) the minor is not under the jurisdiction of the court for any act 
that: 
(i) would be a felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) is a violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled 
Substances Act; or 
(iii) was committed with a weapon; and 
termination of parental rights shall be made within 18 months from the 
date of the child's removal. 
78-30-4.16. Contested adoptions — Rights of parties — 
Determination of custody. 
(1) Whenever any party contests an adoption, the court shall first 
determine whether the provisions of this chapter have been complied 
with. If a party who was entitled to notice and consent under the 
provisions of this chapter, was denied that right, and did not 
otherwise waive or forfeit that right under the terms of this chapter, 
the court may: 
(a) enjoin the adoption, or dismiss the adoption petition, and 
proceed in accordance with Subsection (2); or 
(b) determine whether proper grounds for termination of that 
parent's rights exist and, if so, order that the parent's rights be 
terminated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter or Title 
78, Chapter 3a, Part 4, Termination of Parental Rights Act. 
(2) (a) In any case, and under any circumstance, if a court 
determines that a petition for adoption may not be granted, the court 
may not automatically grant custody of a child to a challenging 
biological parent, but shall conduct an evidentiary hearing in each 
case, in order to determine who should have custody of the child, in 
accordance with the child's best interest. 
(b) Evidence considered at that hearing may include, but is not 
limited to, evidence of psychological or emotional bonds that the child 
-had formed with third parties and any detriment that a change in 
custody may cause to the child. The fact that a person relinquished a 
child to a licensed child placing agency or executed a consent for 
adoption may not be considered by the court as evidence of neglect or 
abandonment. 
(c) Any custody order entered pursuant to this section may also 
include provisions for parent-time by a biological parent or visitation 
by an interested third party, and provide for the financial support of 
the child. 
(3) An adoption may not be contested after the final decree of 
adoption is entered, 
78-30-10. Name and status of adopted child. 
When a final decree of adoption is entered under Section 78-30-9, a 
child may take the family name of the adoptive parent or parents. After 
that decree of adoption is entered, the adoptive parent or parents and 
the child shall sustain the legal relationship of parent and child, 
and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that 
r el a t i onship. 
final plan for the child, taking into account the child1s primary 
permanency goal established by the court pursuant to Section 78-3a-311. 
If the Division of Child and Family Services documents to the court 
that there is a compelling reason that adoption, reunification, 
guardianship, and kinship placement are not in the child"1 s best 
interest, the court may order another planned permanent living 
arrangement, in accordance with federal law. If the child clearly 
desires contact with the parent, the court shall take the child!s 
desire into consideration in determining the final plan. In addition, 
the court shall establish a concurrent plan that identifies the second 
most appropriate final plan for the child. 
(b) The court may not extend reunification services beyond 12 months 
from the date the child was initially removed from the child1s home, in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 78-3a-311, except that the 
ccurt may extend reunification services for no more than 90 days if it 
finds that there has been substantial compliance with the treatment 
plan, that reunification is probable within that 90 day period, and 
that the extension is in the best interest of the child^ In no event 
may any reunification services extend beyond 15 months from the date 
the child was initially removed from the child's home. Delay or failure 
of a parent to establish paternity or seek custody does not provide a 
basis for the court to extend services for that parent beyond that 12-
month period. 
(c) The court may, in its discretion, enter any additional order that 
it determines to be in the best interest of the child, so long as that 
order does not conflict with the requirements and provisions of 
Subsections (3)(a) and (b). The court may order the division to provide 
protective supervision or other services to a child and the child's 
family after the division's custody of a child has been terminated. 
(4) If the final plan for the child is to proceed toward termination 
of parental rights, the petition for termination of parental rights 
shall be filed, and a pretrial held, within 45 calendar days after the 
permanency hearing. 
(5) Any party to an action may, at any time, petition the court for 
an expedited permanency hearing on the basis that continuation of 
reunification efforts are inconsistent with the permanency needs of the 
child. If the court so determines* it shall order* in accordance with 
federal law, that the child be placed in accordance with the permanency 
plan, and that whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent 
placement of the child be completed as quickly as possible. 
(6) Nothing in this section may be construed to: 
(a) entitle any parent to reunification services for any specified 
period of time; 
(b) limit a court1s ability to terminate reunification services at 
any time prior to a permanency hearing; or 
(c) limit or prohibit the filing of a petition for termination of 
parental rights by any party, or a hearing on termination of parental 
xightSy at any time prior to a permanency hearing, if a petition for 
termination of parental rights is filed prior to the date scheduled for 
a permanency*hearing, the court may consolidate the hearing on 
termination of parental rights with the permanency hearing. If the 
court consolidates the hearing on termination of parental rights with 
the permanency hearing, it shall first make a finding whether 
reasonable efforts have been made by the Division of Child and Family 
Services to finalize the permanency goal for the child, and any 
reunification services shall be terminated in accordance with the time 
lines described in Section ^B-Sa-Sll. A decision on the petition for 
(c) the court retains jurisdiction over the minor under conditions 
set by the court and agreed upon by the recruiter or the unit commander 
to which the minor is eventually assigned. 
(4) (a) A DNA specimen shall be obtained from a minor who is under 
the jurisdiction of the court as described in Subsection 53-10-403(3). 
The specimen shall be obtained by designated employees of the court or, 
if the minor is in the legal custody of the Division of Youth 
Corrections, then by designated employees of the division under 
Subsection 53-10-404(5)(b). 
(b) The responsible agency shall ensure that employees designated to 
collect the saliva DNA specimens receive appropriate training and that 
the specimens are obtained in accordance with accepted protocol. 
(c) Reimbursements paid under Subsection 53-10-404(2)(a) shall be 
placed in the DNA Specimen Restricted Account created in Section 53-10-
407. 
(d) Payment of the reimbursement is second in priority to payments 
the minor is ordered to make for restitution under this section and 
treatment under Section 78-3a-318, 
75>-<3a>-<312. Permanency hearing — Final plan — Petition for 
termination of parental rights filed — Hearing on termination of 
parental rights. 
(1) (a) When reunification services have been ordered in accordance 
with Section 78-3a-311, with regard to a child who is in the custody of 
the Division of Child and Family Services, a permanency hearing shall 
be held by the court no later than 12 months after the original removal 
of the child. 
(b) When no reunification services were ordered at the dispositional 
hearing, a permanency hearing shall be held within 30 days from the 
date of the dispositional hearing. 
(2) (a) If reunification services were ordered by the court in 
"accordance with Section 78-3a-311, the co^ art shall, at the permanency 
hearing, determine whether the child may safely be returned to the 
custody of the child's parent. If the court finds, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that return of the child would create a substantial 
risk of detriment to the child's physical or emotional well-being, the 
child may not be returned to the custody of the child's parent. The 
failure of a parent or guardian to participate in, comply with, in 
whole or in part, or to meet the goals of a court approved treatment 
plan constitutes prima facie evidence that return of the child to that 
parent would create a substantial risk of detriment. 
(b) In making a determination under this Subsection (2), the court 
shall review the report prepared by the Division of Child and Family 
Services? any admissible evidence offered by the child's guardian ad 
litem, any report prepared Jby a foster care citizen review board 
pursuant to Section 78-3g-103, any evidence regarding the efforts or 
progress demonstrated by the parent, and the extent to which the parent 
cooperated and availed himself of services provided. 
(3) (a) With regard to a case where reunification services were 
ordered by the court, if a child is not returned to the child's parent 
or guardian at the permanency hearing, the court shall order 
termination of reunification services to the parent, and make a final 
determination regarding whether termination of parental rights, 
adoption? or permanent custody and guardianship is the most appropriate 
78-30-10. Name and status of adopted child. 
When a final decree of adoption is entered under Section 78-30-9, a 
child may take the family name of the adoptive parent or parents. After 
that decree of adoption is entered, the adoptive parent or parents and 
the child shall sustain the legal relationship of parent and child, 
and 
have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that 
relationship. 
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evaluator pursue sex abuse allegations (this will be Dr Jay Jenson). Costs to be split by all 
parties. It is recommended to begin within the next 10 days. 
No order is made regarding make-up visitation. All parties restrained from discussing sex abuse 
charges with Baylie. 
Special master - the agreed upon calendar to start today. Mr Hardinger agrees not to be present 
for the weekend visit this weekend. 
Testimony from the Scotts is denied after discussion of purpose. 
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ORDER: Motion to certify back is denied. Motion to quash is denied. A psycho-sexual 
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4#4€7 
ADDENDUM <3 ^ V ^ / I T " U 
AT. BROOK J. SESSIONS (6136) 
1ARRIS & CARTER, a L.L.C. 
\ttorney for PETITIONER 
J325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
famestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Interest of: 
BLUNDELL, BAYLIE (07 /29/96) 




Judge: JERIL B. WILSON 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing this 5lh day 
of June 2000, for the purpose of hearing the matter of the adoption 
of BAYLIE BLUNDELL, a minor. The Court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and having found that the Petitioners have 
complied with all applicable laws and are fit and proper persons to 
adopt the minor child and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises therefore finds that: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That BAYLIE BLUNDELL, a minor, is hereby declared 
adopted by KENNETH SCOTT and KIMBERLY SCOTT, and 
the said child shall henceforth be regarded and treated in 
all respects as the natural child of KENNETH SCOTT AND 
KIMBERLY SCOTT, and they shall have the legal 
relationship of parent and child and have all rights and 
privileges and be subject to all of the duties of that 
relationship.. 
2. The name of said child shall henceforth be known as 
BAYLIE NICOLE SCOTT, by which name she shall legally and 
lawfully be known. 
3. It is further ordered that the Court file in this matter be 
sealed except for the purposes of the petitioners and their 
counsel procuring certified copies of the Decree of 
Adoption for legal purposes, and that said procurement be 
accomplished within the next 10 days; that thereafter the 
file be opened only upon petition and order of the Court. 
^ 
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